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Distribution of Income and Corpus and
Allocation of Deductions in Louisiana
Estates Which Are in the Process

of Administration*
ALVIN

B. RUBINt

Estates in the process of administration must file an income
tax return. In general the principles applicable to preparation of
this return are the same principles as those which apply to the
return of an individual or a trust. All income realized during
administration of the estate is included in gross income of the
estate. Deductions authorized to the estate include the usual
business and nonbusiness expenses. But there is one deduction
that is allowed on the estate's income tax return that is not
allowed on an individual's return: Income received by the estate
during administration which is properly paid or disbursed to any
legatee or heir during the year is deductible in computing the
estate's income tax. This means that there may be a choice of
whether the tax on certain income shall be paid by the estate as
an entity or by the individual heirs or legatees at their respective
rates. Our first mission will be to explore the question of what
income may be considered "properly paid" in Louisiana, and in
order to do this we shall consider the general question of whether
any distributions may be made from an estate in the course of
administration in Louisiana. Although our discussion of this
topic will deal principally with the effect of Louisiana law, if
any, upon actions otherwise permissible under federal income
tax statutes and regulations, we will try to give some insight
into the general problem to persons who must deal with it in
other states.
* This article contains the substance of an address whi fl the author
delivered to the Tulane Tax Institute, New Orleans, Louisiana, on November
21, 1952. The Tulane Tax Institute, which was held in New Orleans on
November 19-20-21, 1952, was sponsored by the College of Law and the
College of Commerce and Business Administration of Tulane University.
t Member, Baton Rouge Bar; Assistant Professor of Law, Part-time,
Louisiana State University.
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The second portion of this article will deal with a related
but essentially separate topic. In addition to the income tax
return which must be filed for every estate, an estate tax return
must be filed in the case of every decedent whose gross estate
exceeds $60,000. There are some allowable deductions which
may properly be taken either from the gross estate in computing
the estate tax or from the gross income in computing the estate's
income tax. A discussion of these deductions will form the second
portion of the article.
It is always gratifying to the student of tax law to discover
a "taxpayer's choice" in the federal tax laws. By "taxpayer's
choice" is meant a valid option to the taxpayer to handle a matter
in one of two ways in order to attain the greatest tax benefit
without benefit of loopholes and without suspicion of avoidance.
Each of the two portions of this article deals with provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code which recognize the taxpayer's choice.
For that reason it is important that the tax adviser be aware of
the range of the choice and the method of determining which
choice is best.
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND CORPUS IN LOUISIANA

According to Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, "The
net income of the estate or trust shall be computed in the same
manner and on the same basis as in the case of an individual...."
But additional deductions for the estate are allowed by Sections
162 (b) and 162 (c) if income is "to be distributed currently" or if
income is "properly paid or credited" to the heir or legatee. The
heir or legatee then reports the income deducted by the estate on
his individual income tax return. In Louisiana, if a will providing for distribution of income has been left by the decedent,
Section 162 (b) would apply; if, however, there is no will, or if
the will makes no specific provisions for the distribution of
income, then Section 162 (c) perhaps becomes applicable. Some
competent practitioners have questioned whether an amount can
properly be paid out of an estate in the process of administration
in Louisiana, at least in the absence of express authorization in
a will.
The administrator in Louisiana "is the officer appointed to
take charge of and liquidate a succession."" The purposes of the
administration are "the payment of the debts and the eventual
1. Cross, A Treatise on Successions 77 (1891).
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transfer of the residuum to the heirs. '2 The administrator is said
to have "no business to make partition, or to control the property
after the debts are paid."8
But the Louisiana Civil Code contemplates that, at least in
some circumstances, distributions may be made to heirs or legatees before a full administration of the succession is completed.
Article 1012 prohibits the heirs from claiming effects of a succession "which may be in suit" or from receiving "any money of
such succession when there shall be claims thereon pending in
court, unless they give bond with good and sufficient security,
if the plaintiffs in such suits require it .... ." The inference is
possible that, under other circumstances, the heirs may properly
receive "effects" or "money" of the succession. Nor does the
article seem to contemplate that such receipt by the heirs
amounts to termination of the administration. Article 1671 of the
code, dealing with testate successions, permits the heirs to take
seizin from the testamentary executor, "on offering him a sum
sufficient to pay the movable legacies and on complying with
the requirements of Article 1012." Here again is a situation in
which there may be a distribution to heirs from a succession
whose administration is not completed.4
Therefore, notwithstanding the theoretical functions of the
administration, a distribution to heirs may conceivably be made.
There is relatively little jurisprudence directly on the subject.
But if we differentiate the cases in which an executor makes a
distribution, either of corpus or income, to the heirs in advance
of termination of the administration, from the cases in which
the heirs seek to require an unwilling executor or administrator
to make distribution, there is respectable authority for considering distributions in the former situations "properly paid."
Cross, writing in 1891, said that "In the regular performance
of his gestion, an administrator has no right to make payments
to heirs; but in solvent successions it is often done, and credit
allowed him on his account."'5 Later, in discussing the administrator's account, he showed how such disbursements should be
treated. 6 Cases decided before as well as after the publication
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Another pertinent analogy may be drawn from Article 1188, which
contemplates a situation in which distribution is made and thereafter additional creditors "present themselves."

5. Cross, A Treatise on Successions 84 (1891).
6. Cross, A Treatise on Succesions 460 (1891).
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of the treatise sanction, at least in part, distributions pending the
administration."
The only cases which deny the propriety of ordering a partial distribution are those in which the administrator was unwilling to make such payments. 8 In estate planning, it would be well
to note that there is some authority justifying advance payments
where the will of the decedent requires them, 9 and a provision
7. In Boisse v. Dickson, 31 La. Ann. 741 (1879), there had been a distribution during administration to one of seven heirs. Later, plaintiff obtained
judgment against this heir, caused the heir's interest in the succession to be
sold, and purchased that interest. Plaintiff then sought an accounting from
the administratrix. The administratrix set up as credits in her accounting the
amounts distributed. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to claim the
amounts already distributed. Succession of Piffet, 39 La. Ann. 466, 1 So. 889
(1887), permits an inference that a distribution to an heir prior to termination of the administration would not be set aside. In Succession of Sparrow,
42 La. Ann. 500, 7 So. 611 (1890), the administrator listed in his account
distributions to minor heirs and to major heirs. The court did not rule
expressly on the propriety of the advances but found the account acceptable
on the basis that the proof "satisfies us that Chaffe, administrator, made the
advances stated in the tableau ....
" In a later case involving the same succession, Succession of Sparrow, 44 La. Ann. 475, 10 So. 882 (1892), the court
quoted its earlier opinion in 39 La. Ann. 696 at 706, "The administrator's
advances to the minors were manifestly prompted by laudable feelings and
considerations of fairness and humanity, for which [he] should not be made
to suffer ....
" As a "matter of justice" he was permitted credit for such
advances on his account. The court did refer to the proceedings as "irregular" but justified "under the exceptional circumstances stated." (See earlier
opinions in the same matter at 39 La. Ann. 696, 706, 2 So. 501 (1887); 40 La.
Ann. 484, 4 So. 513 (1888). In Succession of Bothnick, 109 La. 1, 33 So. 47
(1902), seven of nine heirs brought a rule to compel a distribution of funds.
The other two heirs objected because they were not made parties to the rule.
The court held that all of the heirs should have been joined but did not hold
a partial distribution improper. In Succession of Ferrill, 166 La. 879, 118 So.
69 (1928), the deceased created a testamentary trust for his daughter. The
trust provided for monthly payments "primarily out of revenues" to the
beneficiary. The beneficiary sought allowance of the monthly payments from
the executors prior to the time the administration was completed and the
funds were turned over to the trustee. The court ordered payment of the
sum because ". . . the object of the testator would be completely defeated if
the executors could withhold that monthly stipend indefinitely whilst settling
up the details of the succession." See also Succession of Heffner, 49 La. Ann.
407, 21 So. 905 (1897).
The following comment expresses the opinion that a distribution is not
valid. Slovenko, Powers of a Succession Representative in Louisiana, 27
Tulane L. Rev. 87, 91 (1952).
8. E.g. Succession of Gilcrease, 181 So. 688 (La. App. 1938). But cf. Sucr
cession of Ferrill, 166 La. 879, 118 So. 69 (1928). Compare also In re Labauve,
39 La. Ann. 388, 1 So. 830 (1887), in which one heir complained that advances
had been made to other heirs but that he had received nothing. The court
held that this heir could not compel advance distribution to himself and
that "the adjustment of the questions relating to the distributive shares of
the heirs and the collections to be made by them ...
should have been relegated to the partition ....
9. See Succession of Ferrill, 166 La. 879, 118 So. 69 (1928). This might also
qualify the distribution as a deduction under 162(b). See also Cross, on
Successions 88 (1891) and case there cited. Since the executor is simply the
personal mandatary of the deceased, there would appear to be little doubt
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in a testament authorizing or requiring the executor to distribute
funds out of income or corpus, or both, might serve a useful
function.
In any event personal observation justifies the conclusion
that, in 1952 as in 1891, the advance partial distribution "is often
done." Assuming that a petition is presented to the court requesting permission to make a distribution, and that a court order for
distribution is entered, this order would presumably be final as
to the validity of the distribution. 10 While the matter is not
therefore entirely free from question, decisions and commentaries presently available would justify a conclusion that distributions may be made of both corpus and income from Louisiana
estates in the process of administration.
Let us for the remainder of this article assume the correctness of that conclusion. The court order for distribution should
be after due advertisement, and should specify whether the distribution is to be made from income, from corpus, or in specified
proportions from both. Rules for determination of proportions
are found in Section 162 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code.
To the extent that a distribution can be made from income,
a "taxpayer's choice" arises. Will it reduce the ultimate tax
burden to keep the income in the estate, report it on the estate
tax return, and pay the tax on that basis, or would it be less
costly taxwise to distribute the income to the heirs and allow
them to report it on their individual returns? To determine the
answer to this question, several computations may be necessary.
Obviously, if there are several heirs in low income tax brackets
and the estate is in a high income tax bracket, a total or partial
income distribution will result in tax saving. On the other hand,
if the heirs are already in high income tax brackets and the
estate's income is relatively smaller than the heirs, a tax saving
will result if the estate reports the income.
From Table I (see addendum), some computations can be
made to illustrate the factors of choice. If there are two heirs,
both married and both entitled to the benefits of income-splitting,
and if each of them has a net income, before splitting, of $12,000
that a Louisiana will might validly provide for current distributions of
income.
10. See Baron v. Baum, 46 La. Ann. 1101, 15 So. 364 (1894); Succession of
Spyker, 159 So. 347 (La. App. 1935). Of course such an order might not preclude the Collector of Internal Revenue because the proceeding is not an
adversary one.
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a year, then any additional income which accrues to them will
be taxed at a rate of 34% (see column 5). If the estate's net
income is under $2,000 for the year, it will be in a bracket taxed
at 22.2%. Therefore $120 in tax saving per $1,000 of income
would result from retaining the income in the estate for each
year in which the income could be lawfully retained.
Another illustration will demonstrate a contrary situation.
Assume that the two heirs are married but they each have net
incomes of $3,000 a year, and the estate has an income of $20,000.
If we examine line 1 on Table I, we will see that the estate's
income tax rate is 62% (column 4), but that the heirs' rate, if
the full income is distributed, is 38%. A substantial saving is
available by distribution of all of the income, and an even greater
saving may be made by distributing only that part of the income
necessary to bring the estate's income tax rate down to a rate
equal with that of the heirs.
Of course, other problems arise. The heirs may, and generally do, have unequal incomes. A tax saving to one heir may
be offset by a tax loss to another heir. But these are factors to
be weighed in the ultimate consideration of whether distribution
or retention of income is advisable and whether any tax benefit
will arise from one course of action as compared with the other.
One further consideration suggests itself. It may be advantageous taxwise, particularly where the heirs have substantial
incomes, to retain income in the estate. How long can this be
done? The regulations give one answer to this question. "The
period of administration or setlement of the estate is the period
required by the executor or administrator to perform the ordinary duties pertaining to administration, in particular the collection of assets and the payment of debts and legacies.""u This
standard would require a factual determination in each case as
to whether administration of the estate is being unduly pro12
tracted.
Where the administration of the estate has been found to
have continued beyond the "period required . . . to perform the
11. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.162-1.

The regulations were considered

approvingly in Chick v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 337 (1st Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 845 (1948).
12. Stewart v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 397 (5th Cir. 1952); Adams v.
Commissioner, 110 F. 2d 578 (8th Cir. 1940). See, as illustrative of the considerations to be weighed, King, 3 TCM 11, Dec. 13, 678(M). See also Roebling,
18 TC.... (1952), holding income taxable to the beneficiaries on the ground
that administration was unduly prolonged.
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ordinary duties pertaining to administration," the income of the
estate during the unduly extended period is taxable to the beneficiaries, just as if it had been distributed. 18 A testamentary provision as to the period of administration is not controlling if it
14
extends beyond the time ordinarily required.
Normally the date of final distribution to the beneficiaries
is the date of closing the administration. 5 However, the requisite
period to perform the ordinary duties of administration obviously
depends at least to some extent on the nature of those duties
under state law. In Louisiana, 'the Civil Code apparently contemplates a situation in which a part of the estate is distributed
and the remainder continued in administration." Of course in
the event of such action, the estate's return would account for
income only from the assets retained.
In the usual administration in Louisiana, the administration
terminates upon the rendition of the court order discharging
the administrator. This occurs after the date of distribution of
the assets of the estate, which follows approval (or homologation)
of the administrator's tableau of distribution, and the usually
concomitant order or judgment to distribute the assets. It is
possible to urge, therefore, three dates as ending the period
required to perform the duties of administration: (1) The date
of homologation of the tableau of distribution; (2) the date of
actual distribution of the estate's assets; 1'7 (3) the date of discharge of the administrator. These dates normally fall within a
relatively short time of each other and therefore there would
usually be no issue raised by the choice of one or the other of
them. However, considering the regulations, it seems that the
second suggestion (the date of actual distribution) is the date on
which the income tax burden is shifted from the estate to the
heirs or legatees. It should be noted that it is possible that the
period of administration may not be considered ended at this
time, particularly if the order for distribution of the estate was
improvidently entered.' 8
13. Estate of W. G. Farrier, 15 TC 277 (1950); Josephine Stewart, 16 TC
1 (1951).
14. Marion M. Jackson, 18 BTA 875 (1930).
15. See IT 3556, 1942-1 Cum. Bull. 130.
16. See Arts. 1012, 1671, La. Civil Code of 1870. See Succession of Marinoni, 192 La. 751, 189 So. 124 (1939) (involving interpretation of Article 1671).
17. See Succession of Braun, 187 La. 185, 174 So. 257 (1937), in which the
Court said that a judgment sending the heirs into possession "did not close
the succession." It must be accompanied by an order compelling the succession representative to render an account.
18. See Succession of Pizzati, 147 La. 496, 85 So. 218 (1920), in which an
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In view of the fact that estate taxes are a debt of the estate,
and in view of the administrator's personal liability for them if
the taxes are not paid, 9 it should be possible to extend the period
required for administration at least long enough to secure an
audit and a discharge of the administrator from personal liability.
To be certain that the length of time spent awaiting this discharge is not construed to be unreasonably extended by the taxpayer it is advisable to file as soon as possible a request for
prompt determination of the amount of estate tax due and for
discharge of the administrator from personal liability."2 0
THE ALLOCATION OF DEDUCTIONS

The taxpayer has the choice of claiming certain deductions
either on the estate's income tax return or on the estate tax
return. This choice was created in the main by the 1942 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code.
Prior to 1942, it had been held that non-business expenses
were not deductible on an individual's income tax return.2' The
1942 act added Section 23 (a) (2) to the code, providing for the
deduction of "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year for the production or collection of
income . . . ." This widened substantially the range of allowable
deductions on the individual income tax return. Since in general
the same deductions allowed to an individual are allowed on
ex parte order obtained by the executor, sending a widow and heirs Into
possession of property omitted from an original inventory, was improvidently
granted. Cf. Succession of Uthoff, 196 La. 892, 200 So. 290 (1941), which held
heirs properly sent into possession despite the pendency of claims against
the succession, with cases cited and distinguished therein. In Kelley v. Kelley,
198 La. 338, 3 So. 2d 641 (1941), a succession sale held after a judgment sending
heirs into possession was held valid on the ground that the judgment of
possession was not properly entered since the heirs were minors and could
only accept with the benefit of inventory. Compare Succession of Moore, 42
So. 2d 907 (La. App. 1949), in which it was held that the heirs were entitled
to be placed in possession of movable effects at the time the administratrix
filed her final account.
19. See Int. Rev. Code § 900; U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.99.
20. See Int. Rev. Code § 825. The procedure for such application is set
forth In Code of Federal Regulations, 1949 Edition, Tit. 26, Part 601, § 601.31.
There Is of course liability on the part of transferees for the estate tax. See
Equitable Trust Company, 13 TC 731 (1949), for a typical case holding the
transferee of the estate liable. The property of the estate remains subject to
tax, and the liability for the estate tax primes a mortgage given by the heirs
even though no tax lien is recorded. Detroit Bank v. U.S., 317 U.S. 329 (1943).
Therefore there Is in effect a cloud on the title to the estate's property pending final settlement of the tax, and this argument might likewise be urged
as valid ground for failure to close the estate until the clearance is granted.
21. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
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the estate's income tax return, this amendment likewise made
additional allowable deductions on that return.
The extra latitude provided was not quite so wide as that
provided for an individual taxpayer because the regulations had
permitted somewhat greater scope in determining the ordinary
and necessary business expenses of an estate than in determining those of an individual. Nonetheless, the regulations prior to
1942 provided that expenses incurred in probate proceedings, in
collecting non-income assets of the estate, in adjusting claims
against the decedent, and in conserving assets or distributing
assets to the beneficiaries were not deductible. Despite the addition of Section 23(a) (2) to the code in 1942, these regulations
were not changed. In 1945, however, the Supreme Court applied
Section 23 (a) (2) to allow a deduction to a trust for legal fees
incurred in contesting an income tax deficiency and for legal
fees incurred in distributing the assets of the trust fund to the
beneficiaries.2 2 Following that decision the Treasury withdrew
the pre-1942 regulation. It substituted a provision that expenses
incurred in connection with performance of "the duties of administration" are deductible under Section 23 (a) (2) .23
While it is not our purpose here to explore the limits of the
additional allowable deductions thus recognized, it is clear that
some administration expenses which could formerly be deducted
only in computing the estate tax can now be deducted in computing the estate's income tax as well. Congress did limit the
situation to one of a choice by adding Section 162 (e) to the code
providing that amounts which might be deductible in computing
the net estate shall not be allowed as deductions on the estate's
income tax return unless there is filed a waiver of the right to
have the deductions allowed on the estate tax return. 24 This provision was necessary because of the possibility of a construction
of the law to permit the same deduction to be taken on both
25
returns.
Thus, although there is a choice, the choice must be made
early. If a claimed deduction might be allowed on both returns,
22.
23.
24.
25.

Bingham Trust v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
U.S. Treas. Reg, 111, § 29.23(A)-15.
See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.162-1.
See Adams v. Commissioner, 110 F. 2d 578 (8th Cir. 1940), holding that

the Commissioner could not deny deductions in computing the net estate for
the purpose of the estate tax on the ground that "some or all of the deductions claimed here were claimed also in connection with returns for income
taxation of the estate."
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it will be disallowed on the estate's income tax return unless the
right to deduct it in computing the estate tax is waived. That
being so, the taxpayer must make his choice early and wisely.
It immediately becomes obvious that where an estate is
relatively small, but the annual income of the estate is relatively
large, every possible deduction should be thrown into the income
tax return. Conversely, where the net estate is large and the
annual income relatively small, every possible deduction should
be utilized to reduce the net estate. A comparison of columns
2 and 4 in Table I will give an approximate idea of the type of
comparison to be made in determining whether allowable deductions should be allocated to the estate tax return or to the estate's
income tax return. Where the net estate is approximately $300,000, any deductions from the net estate will create a saving of
30% of the amount of the deduction (line h). Where the estate's
net income exceeds $6,000, an income deduction will save 34%
of the amount of the deduction (line j, column 4). Therefore, if
the net estate is expected to be $300,000 and the annual net
income of the estate is expected to be $6,500, a $500 deduction
will save $20 in taxes if taken on the income tax return rather
than on the estate tax return.
It will be noted that, as a practical matter, in most situations
where an estate contains income producing properties, claiming
the deduction on the income tax return will be advantageous.
This is not universally true, however. If the net estate is $4,000,000 a deduction will reduce the tax by 63% of its amount (line r,
column 2). If this estate expected $8,500 in net income, a $500
deduction on the income tax return would reduce the income
tax by 38% of the amount of the deduction (line 1, column 4).
Therefore, claiming the $500 deduction on the estate tax return
would result in a tax saving of $125 (63% less 38% equals 25%.
25% times $500 equals $125).
Note, however, that this choice does not apply to all items
which might be deductible in computing the net estate. Funeral
expenses, for example, could not be deemed in any sense an
income tax reduction. The legal expense of administration could,
however, be an item of choice. The same thing would be true of
much of the court costs. Conversely, not all items which might
be deducted on the estate's income tax return would be deduc26
tible in computing the net estate.
26. See, for example, Estate of Bluestein, 15 TC 770 (1950), following
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Although no explicit criterion is set forth either in the law
or regulations, the choice seems to extend throughout the range
of expenses incurred in collection of income of the estate, administration of the estate, and maintenance of property of the
estate. 27
If the decision is made to deduct attorney's fees in computing
the estate tax, some thought should be given to the fact that a
claim for refund may be filed and that additional attorney's fees
may be incurred in that action. For a time a conflict in the cases
existed as to the right later to amend the estate tax return to
claim a deduction for the additional fees paid.28 In 1947 a section
was added to the regulations providing that the refund due upon
deduction of the additional attorney fees sustained in prosecuting
the principal refund claim should be sought at the time of the
principal refund claim.'
Louisiana practitioners should also note that the full costs
of administration of an estate consisting of community property
have been held deductible in computing the net estate, in the
face of the commissioner's contention that one-half of these
charges should have been borne by the surviving spouse. 30 This
may influence the choice of returns on which to claim the deduction because, if claimed as an income tax deduction, the deductible item would presumably be divided between the estate's
return and the surviving spouse's return.8 '
Estate of Lowenstein, 12 TC 694 (1949). Here charitable gifts were made by
a partnership in which the estate was a member. These were deductible on
the estate's income tax return although they would not have been otherwise
deductible because they were not made pursuant to the terms of the will.
27. Among the deductions which have been allowed are: capital loss on
worthless bonds, Jones v. Whittington, 194 F. 2d 812 (10th Cir. 1952); widow's
annual allowance required to be paid from income, Sneed, 17 TC.... (1952)
(non-acq.); legal expense in obtaining income tax r~fund, Howard E. Cammack, 5 TC 467 (1945) (acq.); legal expense in unsuccessful litigation (for
income tax refund?), James A. Connelly, 6 TC 744 (1946) (acq.). But cf.
Hall, 17 TC....No. 5 (1951) denying a deduction for premiums paid by estate
on life insurance policy on life of a debtor. (An appeal of this decision is
pending in the Second Circuit.)
28. Compare Magruder v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 159 F. 2d 913 (4th
Cir. 1947), with Cleveland v. Higgins, 148 F. 2d 722 (2d Cir. 1945).
29. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.34, added Dec. 22, 1947, by TD 5596. The
validity of this regulation was sustained in Van Dyke v. Kuhl, 171 F. 2d 187
(7th Cir. 1948).
30. Vaccaro v. U.S., 55 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. La. 1944).
31. See Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F. 2d 310 (5th Cir. 1946).
But cf. Henderson, 2 TCM 1092, Dec. 13, 631(M), holding that if there were
debts in substantial amounts the estate was taxable on the entire income from
community property. See also Newman, 37 BTA 72 (1938) (acq.) where there
were no debts and the income was split.
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Another interesting problem can only be suggested here.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1194 provides for a commission to
the executor of 22% "on the amount of the effects of the succession." This would be an expense of administration subject to
the taxpayer's choice, whether paid out of income or corpus.8 2
Can the commission be increased, thus giving additional income
to the executor, which, under some circumstances, might effect
an overall tax saving? No definitive answer can be given, but
8
some authorities are set forth in the footnotes.
Since no rule to the contrary is stated in the regulations,
it would appear permissible for the executor to deduct some
items on the income tax return and others on the estate tax
return. Thus, if it were advantageous to do so, legal expense in
administration might be deducted on the estate's income tax
return and all other expenses might be claimed as deductions
from the gross estate. In addition, what is done in one year on
the estate's income tax return is not a choice for future years.
Therefore, although certain expenses might be deducted on the
estate tax return, like expenses could be reserved for use on the
estate's income tax return.
Of course, the problem of allocation of deductions diminishes
in importance as the period of administration is shortened. But
the taxpayer may make his choice if any administration is had,
however brief. In most cases the tax saving available by wise
use of the taxpayer's choice will be substantially enough to
justify full consideration of the alternatives available.
32. IT 3736, 1945 Cum. Bull. 102.
33. The commission may be computed on income as well as on inventory
of the estate. Succession of Sparrow, 40 La. Ann. 484, 4 So. 513 (1888). Contra:
Young v. Chaney, 3 La, 462 (1832). Cases holding that an administrator may

not charge for any services rendered beyond the amount of this commission
include
49 La.
(1882);
On

Succession of Sprowl, 21 La. Ann. 544 (1869); Succession of Calloway,
Ann. 968, 22 So. 225 (1897); Succession of Turnell, 34 La. Ann. 888
cf. Succession of Linton, 31 La. Ann. 130 (1879).
the other hand in Succession of Moore, 28 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 1946),

a judgment of the district court reducing the commission of the administratrix to 5% was affirmed. In Succession of Robertson, 49 La. Ann. 80, 21 So.
197 (1896), the court allowed a 5% commission for revenues collected during

administration.
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TABLE I-SELECTED ILLUSTRATIVE TAX RATES
(Does not include state inheritance taxes.)
2.

I.

4.

3.

6.

5.

00

6000

3%6

'."

'am

-

6!

0z=
ob

65000

7

(,c)

70,000

11%

Ce)

100,000

22 %

Under $2,000

22.2%

34%

24.6%

(f)

110,000

25%

2,000

24.6%

34%

24.6%

(g)

120,000

28%

4,000

29%

34%

29%

(h)

160,000

30%

Ci)

310,000

32%

Ci)

560,000

35%

6,000

34%

34%

29%

(k)

810,000

37%

(1)

1,060,000

39%

8,000

38%

38%

29%

(in)

1,310.000

42%

10,000

42%

38%

29%

Cn)

1, 560,000

45%

Co)

2.060,000

49%

12,000"

48%

38%

34%

(p)

2,560,000

53%

14.000

53%

38%

34%

(q)

3.060,000

56%

16,000

56%

42%

34%

(r)

4.060,000

63 %

20,000

62 %

42%

38%

22,000

66%

42%

38%

Cd)

80,000

14%

Cs)

5.060,000

67%

26,000

67%

48%

38%

Ct)

6,060.000

70%

32.000

68%

53%

42%

Cu)

7.060,000

73 %

38,000

72%

53 %

48%

Cv)
w)

8,060,000
10,060.000

76%
77%

44,000
50,000

75%
77%

56%
59%

53%
53 %

60,000

80%

62%

56%

